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In a recent address at a meeting of the International Bar Association
in Washington, D.C., Justice Anthony Kennedy told the audience that
"[t]o re-examine your premise is not a sign of weakness of your judicial
philosophy. It's a sign of fidelity to your judicial oath."' The Associated
Press report of the address speculated that Justice Kennedy's words
"sounded like a partial explanation of his votes in two recent cases
involving race, in which he uncharacteristically sided with liberal
justices." 2
Whatever the motivation for Justice Kennedy's remarks, I do
perceive a recent change of course in his views in at least one area of the
law-civil procedure. This symposium celebrates the fiftieth
anniversary of the 1966 amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, particularly the amendments to Rule 23, the class action rule.
The 1966 amendments to Rule 23 sought self-consciously "to shake the
law of class actions free of abstract categories . . . and to rebuild the law
on functional lines responsive to those recurrent life patterns which call
* This essay was written for a symposium celebrating the 1966 amendments to Rule 23, the federal
class action rule. It argues that, in his recent decisions, Justice Kennedy appears to be shifting his
thinking on the relationship between substance and procedure, particularly in the class action
context. I argue that this shift is worth celebrating and is consistent with the functional concerns that
animated the 1966 amendments.
** Professor of Law, University of Miami School of Law. I want to thank Owen Fiss, Pat
Gudridge, Leah Litman, Steve Schnably, Adam Steinman, and Adam Zimmerman for their
comments and conversation. I also want to thank participants at a workshop at the University of
Alabama School of Law for their thoughts and suggestions on a previous draft. Hailey Blanco, Sarah
J. Cohen, and Alyssa D'Bazo provided excellent research assistance. I acknowledge that I
participated in an amicus brief in a case discussed in this article-Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo,
136 S. Ct. 1036 (2016). However, I received no compensation for my work on this brief and the
views express here are solely my own. Of course, all errors are mine.
1. Mark Sherman, Justice: Changing Course on the Bench Is Not Weakness, AP NEWS (Sept.
23, 2016), https://apnews.com/93476b06b78c409393f38df4d5d507b 7 (last visited Mar. 17, 2017).
2. Id. The "two recent cases" referred to in the article are Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin,
136 S. Ct. 2198 (2016) and Tex. Dep't of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc.,
135 S. Ct. 2507 (2015). Id.
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for mass litigation through representative[s]." 3 Although it is unclear
whether the 1966 amendments to Rule 23 were successful, 4 they were
certainly consequential, as they gave birth to the modem class action.
I perceive a similar, albeit not as seismic, shift in Justice Kennedy's
views on the relationship between substance and procedure. As recently
as six years ago, Justice Kennedy held a view of due process that, like
Rule 23 prior to the 1966 amendments, was based on an "abstract"
picture of procedure that ignored substantive matters like policy or
fairness.' But in his most recent decisions involving the class action6 and
other procedural matters,7 Justice Kennedy has adopted a more
functional view of procedure in which procedures should "respon[d] to
those recurrent life patterns" that arise in different substantive contexts.
Of course, what I perceive to be a change of course may simply be
an outlier in Justice Kennedy's overall views of procedure, or may be
consistent with those views properly understood. Any change may also
reflect two different strands of Justice Kennedy's thinking on procedure
that have yet to be reconciled. Accordingly, this essay does not in any
way purport to present a comprehensive or exhaustive account of Justice
Kennedy's views on procedure. Instead, I focus on Justice Kennedy's
views in the past six years or so, in which a change of course has been
noticeable, at least to me. Whether any shift represents no shift at all, a
reversion to the mean, or an unstable hybrid, I leave to constitutional law
scholars.
Nevertheless, to borrow Justice Kennedy's terms, I do perceive in his
recent decisions a "re-examin[ation]" of certain "premise[s]" concerning
the relationship of procedure to the substantive law.9 And, in my view,
this re-examination is worth exploring, even celebrating, on the fiftieth
anniversary of the modern class action.
In this short essay I discuss what I perceive to be Justice Kennedy's
prior view of the relationship between substance and procedure, and the
3. Benjamin Kaplan, A Prefatory Note, 10 B.C. INDus. & COM. L. REv. 497, 497 (1969).
Ben Kaplan was the reporter for the 1966 amendments.
4. See Robert G. Bone, Walking the Class Action Maze: Toward a More Functional Rule 23,
46 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 1097, 1103-05 (2013) (arguing that they were not).
5. See generally J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873 (2011).
6. See generally Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo, 136 S. Ct. 1036 (2016).
7. E.g., Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2668 (2014) (Kennedy, J., dissenting)
(discussing Article III standing).
8. Kaplan, supra note 3, at 497.
9. This essay is an offshoot of a much larger project on the Supreme Court's recent class
action decisions. See Sergio J. Campos & Adam Zimmerman, The Class Action Awakens (March 8,
2017) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
1026 Vol. 65
CHANGING COURSE
more recent view on that relationship he has expressed in his more recent
opinions. I conclude by suggesting that Justice Kennedy's shifting views
are not only a welcome departure, but can be understood as throwback to
the "functional" approach that motivated the 1966 amendments.
II. JUSTICE KENNEDY AND THE IDEAL OF PROCEDURE
A. Personal Jurisdiction
To understand why I perceive a recent change of course in Justice
Kennedy's views on procedure, one need only look at his plurality
opinion in J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro. Decided in 2011,
Nicastro involved a state law products liability action brought by a scrap
metal worker who "seriously injured his hand using a metal-shearing
machine manufactured by [the defendant]."1o At issue was whether New
Jersey state courts could exercise personal jurisdiction over the defendant
J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. (McIntyre), who was based in England and
who had an arm's-length arrangement with the American distributor who
sold the machine in the case." Moreover, although McIntyre advertised
its machines in the United States, it never expressly targeted the New
Jersey market, instead directing its marketing materials to the U.S.
market as a whole. 12
Nicastro raised the issue of whether an out-of-state defendant could
be haled into a U.S. court based on a product reaching the forum through
the stream of commerce. In a series of cases decided in the 1980s the
Court struggled with applying the modem standard for personal
jurisdiction, first articulated in International Shoe,1 3 to such stream-of-
commerce cases. In International Shoe the Court broke from its earlier
approach to personal jurisdiction, which focused on an out-of-state
defendant's presence in the forum state. 14  Such a move was
understandable given the great lengths the defendant in International
Shoe went to in order to do business in the state of Washington without
being "present within the state."1 For example, the defendant (1) did not
keep any shoe inventory in the state, (2) rented "rooms in hotels or
business buildings temporarily" to show samples, and (3) only gave its
10. Nicastro, 564 U.S. at 878.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 878-79.
13. Int'l Shoe Co. v. Wash., 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
14. See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 733 (1877).
15. Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316-17.
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salesmen samples "consisting of one shoe of a pair."1 6 Instead of looking
at a defendant's "presence" in the forum state, the Court instead focused
on whether the defendant's "minimum contacts" with a forum permitted
the exercise of jurisdiction such that a forum court would not offend
"traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice."l7 This
"minimum contacts" test has since become the standard for ascertaining
when a court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonconsenting
defendant.18
Since International Shoe, and with a few exceptions,1 9 there has been
some consensus that, as far as "minimum contacts" go, the defendant
must "purposefully avail[] itself of the privilege of conducting activities
within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its
laws."20 For example, a forum could not exercise jurisdiction simply
because the product inadvertently appeared in the forum through the
"unilateral activity" of the consumer.21
But there was disagreement as to how much "purposeful availment"
was necessary in stream-of-commerce cases. In World- Wide
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, decided in 1980, a majority of the Court
suggested in dicta that a forum could exercise jurisdiction over an out-of-
state defendant if the defendant "deliver[ed] its products into the stream
of commerce with the expectation that they will be purchased by
consumers in the forum State." 2 2  Seven years later, in Asahi Metal
Industry Co., Ltd. v. Superior Court, at least four justices continued to
hold this view. 2 3 However, four other justices in Asahi believed that
more than merely placing a product in the "stream of commerce" was
necessary. Instead, the defendant must act in way that is "purposefully
directed toward the forum State" beyond having an "awareness that the
stream of commerce may or will sweep the product into the forum
State."2 4
16. Id. at 313-14.
17. Id. at 316.
18. See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 207 (1977) ("The standard for determining whether
an exercise of jurisdiction over the interests of persons is consistent with the Due Process Clause is
the minimum-contacts standard elucidated in International Shoe.").
19. See McGee v. Int'l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223-24 (1957) (permitting the exercise of
personal jurisdiction based solely on maintaining a single insurance policy in the forum).
20. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958).
21. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 298 (1980).
22. Id.
23. 480 U.S. 102, 118-20 (1987) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
24. Id. at 112.
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There was also disagreement as to the role "traditional notions of fair
play and substantial justice" play in stream-of-commerce cases. On the
one hand, despite the disagreement on minimum contacts, eight of the
nine justices in Asahi agreed that the exercise of jurisdiction would
offend such traditional notions because, among other things, both the
plaintiff and defendant were foreign companies based in East Asia, and
neither party (or the state for that matter) had any real interest in
resolving their dispute in California state court.25 Indeed, Justice
O'Connor, writing for all but one justice, quoted Volkswagen in
identifying five factors for determining whether a court's exercise of
personal jurisdiction violated such "traditional notions": "[1] the burden
on the defendant, [2] the interests of the forum State, . . . [3] the
plaintiffs interest in obtaining relief . .. [4] 'the interstate judicial
system's interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of
controversies; and [5] the shared interest of the several States in
furthering fundamental substantive social policies."' 26
However, the lone justice who did not join this "traditional notions"
holding in Asahi, Justice Scalia, would later express his view of the role
of the "traditional notions" analysis in a non-stream-of-commerce case,
Burnham v. Superior Court.27 There, Justice Scalia concluded that a
focus on "traditional notions" should jettison substantive considerations
like the five Volkswagen/Asahi factors altogether and instead focus on
those minimum contacts which "traditionally" were considered
sufficient.28 In other words, personal jurisdiction should be based solely
on traditionally recognized "minimum contacts" like personal service in
the forum state, and not on "each Justice's subjective assessment of what
is fair and just."29
The consequence of Justice Scalia's rejection of an independent
fairness inquiry concerning the exercise of personal jurisdiction is that it
prioritized certain procedures regardless of their substantive impact.
Justice Scalia's view was ostensibly based on the "subjectivity, and
hence inadequacy" of using the "traditional notions" prong of the test to
assess the overall fairness of the exercise of jurisdiction.3 0 But it also
25. Id. at 113-16 (noting "the international context, the heavy burden on the alien defendant,
and the slight interests of the plaintiff and the forum State").
26. Id. at 113 (quoting Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292).
27. 495 U.S. 604 (1990). Burnham concerned whether a California state court could exercise
jurisdiction over a New Jersey resident who was served a divorce petition in California while
visiting his children after a separation from his spouse. Id. at 607-08.
28. Id. at 621-23.




rested on a view of the supremacy of traditional procedures, remarking
that "[t]he short of the matter is that jurisdiction based on physical
presence alone constitutes due process because it is one of the continuing
traditions of our legal system that define the due process standard of
'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice."' 3 1 Nevertheless,
whether out of judicial modesty or a reverence for tradition, Justice
Scalia refused to consider the substantive impact of procedures like the
exercise of personal jurisdiction.
Compare this approach to Justice Brennan, who championed the use
of the "traditional notions" prong to independently assess the substantive
impact of the exercise of personal jurisdiction. In a contract case decided
shortly before Asahi, Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 3 2 Justice Brennan
noted, in particular, that "a forum legitimately may exercise personal
jurisdiction over a nonresident" because, among other things, "[a] State
generally has a 'manifest interest' in providing its residents with a
convenient forum for redressing injuries inflicted by out-of-state
actors."33 Moreover, it may be unfair to allow a nonresident to escape
the consequences of its actions when it has "purposefully derive[d]
benefit" from the state.34 Whereas Justice Scalia ignored the substantive
impact of procedures in justifying the exercise of personal jurisdiction, in
Burger King Justice Brennan began with the substantive impact of
exercising jurisdiction over nonresidents to justify the exercise of
personal jurisdiction in certain cases. In fact, Justice Brennan further
suggested that an independent inquiry into such substantive issues could
"serve to establish the reasonableness of jurisdiction upon a lesser
showing of minimum contacts than would otherwise be required."3 5
It is against this background that the Court decided Nicastro in 2011,
over thirty years after Volkswagen and over twenty years after Burnham.
One issue in Nicastro concerned whether the "stream-of-commerce"
theory of minimum contacts outlined in dicta in Volkswagen would
command a majority on the Court, or whether Justice O'Connor's more
stringent, "substantial connection" standard set forth in Asahi would
prevail.36 There was also the question of whether the Court would accept
Justice Scalia's theory of "traditional notions," or Justice Brennan's
much stronger version based on the substantive impact of any exercise of
31. Id. at 619.
32. 471 U.S. 462 (1985).
33. Id. at 473.
34. Id. (quoting Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 96 (1978)).
35. Id. at 477.
36. J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 882-83 (2011).
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personal jurisdiction. Of course, by 2011, Justice Brennan was no longer
on the Court, but Justice Scalia and his views remained. And it is hard
not to detect the influence of Justice Scalia's views in Justice Kennedy's
plurality opinion in Nicastro.
Justice Kennedy, writing for three other justices, including Justice
Scalia, approached Nicastro in much the same way that Justice Scalia
approached Burnham-by looking to history and tradition to determine
the underlying principles that governed permissible exercises of personal
jurisdiction. Indeed, Justice Kennedy stated up front that "[f]reeform
notions of fundamental fairness divorced from traditional practice
cannot transform a judgment rendered in the absence of authority into
law."3 7
Justice Kennedy concluded that appeals to such things as "presence"
and "purposeful availment" in the prior case law reflect an insistence on
"circumstances, or a course of conduct, from which it is proper to infer
an intention to benefit from and thus an intention to submit to the laws of
the forum State."3 8 Accordingly, Justice Kennedy further concluded that,
to determine whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction is appropriate
in stream-of-commerce cases, "[t]he principal inquiry in cases of this sort
is whether the defendant's activities manifest an intention to submit to
the power of a sovereign. "39 In other words, a court must look at
whether, through its actions, a defendant intends to submit itself to a
forum's coercive power.
As for an independent "traditional notions" analysis, Justice
Kennedy eschewed the five factors outlined in Volkswagen and Asahi.
Noting that a plurality in Burnham "conducted no independent inquiry
into the desirability or fairness" of personal jurisdiction in that case,
Justice Kennedy pointed out that
[f]urthermore, were general fairness considerations the touchstone of
jurisdiction, a lack of purposeful availment might be excused where
carefully crafted judicial procedures could otherwise protect the
defendant's interests, or where the plaintiff would suffer substantial
hardship if forced to litigate in a foreign forum. That such
considerations have not been deemed controlling is instructive. 40
37. Id. at 880 (emphasis added).
38. Id. at 881 (emphasis added).
39. Id. at 882.




This passage is remarkable for two reasons. First, the parties'
interests were explicitly taken into account in both Volkswagen and
Asahi, and were arguably "controlling." Indeed, Asahi commanded a
majority because eight justices agreed that the interests of the plaintiff
and defendant, among other things, did not support personal jurisdiction.
Admittedly, Asahi involved prohibiting the exercise of jurisdiction, not
the granting of jurisdiction in the absence of purposeful availment. But,
just two years prior in Burger King, Justice Brennan, writing for a
majority, did state that an inquiry into "traditional notions" "serve[s] to
establish the reasonableness of jurisdiction upon a lesser showing of
minimum contacts than would otherwise be required."" Thus, it was far
from clear that prior case law prevented such fairness considerations
from justifying the exercise of personal jurisdiction in the absence of
purposeful availment.
Second, the very concept of "traditional notions" introduced by the
Court in International Shoe was designed to cast aside "fictions of
implied consent" by giving fairness considerations weight, as pointed out
by Justice Ginsburg in dissent, quoting, of all cases, Burnham.4 2 Indeed,
the majority in International Shoe engendered a separate opinion from
Justice Black, who, like Justice Scalia, was a textualist.43 In his opinion
Justice Black criticized the International Shoe majority's use of the terms
"fair play," "justice," and "reasonableness" by stating that "[n]o one, not
even those who most feared a democratic government, ever formally
proposed that courts should be given power to invalidate legislation
under any such elastic standards.""
Ultimately, Justice Kennedy's "manifest intent" standard did not
garner a majority, and thus is not law. Indeed, in a concurrence Justice
Breyer, joined by Justice Alito, expressed a concern that such a standard
could lead to unjust results in cases involving internet retailers.4 5  But
41. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 477 (1985) (emphasis added).
42. Nicastro, 564 U.S. at 900-01 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing, inter alia, Burnham v.
Super. Ct., 495 U.S. 604, 618 (1990)).
43. See Michael J. Gerhardt, A Tale of Two Textualists: A Critical Comparison of Justices
Black and Scalia, 74 B.U. L. REv. 25, 29 (1994) ("Both [Justices Black and Scalia] have espoused a
theory of constitutional interpretation that requires judges to hew as closely as possible to
constitutional text. Where the text is clear, this approach requires adhering to its plain meaning.").
44. Int'l Shoe Co. v. Wash., 326 U.S. 310, 324-25 (opinion of Black, J.).
45. Nicastro, 564 U.S. at 890 (Breyer, J., concurring) ("But what do those standards mean
when a company targets the world by selling products from its Web site? And does it matter if,
instead of shipping the products directly, a company consigns the products through an intermediary
(say, Amazon.com) who then receives and fulfills the orders? And what if the company markets its
products through popup advertisements that it knows will be viewed in a forum? Those issues have
serious commercial consequences but are totally absent in this case.").
Vol. 651032
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Justice Kennedy's plurality opinion did display a view that the
substantive impact of a procedure is irrelevant to determining whether
that procedure satisfies due process. In Nicastro, Justice Kennedy made
clear that issues of personal jurisdiction implicate an individual's liberty
interests under the Due Process Clause.46 Thus, one can infer from
Justice Kennedy's opinion that the key to satisfying the due process
concerns inherent in doctrines like personal jurisdiction is to intuit what
ideal procedures have been permitted (in the case of personal
jurisdiction, procedures that suggest implied consent), and not consider
anything else.
B. Class Actions
Around the time of Nicastro, Justice Kennedy also strongly hinted
that a similar "ideal procedure" view of due process informed his views
of class actions. This is evidenced by a little seen opinion he authored
concurring in the denial of certiorari in a class action case. That case,
DTD Enters., Inc. v. Wells, concerned a class action filed in New Jersey
state court asserting claims against a "commercial dating-referral
service.",4 7 The claims were small, leading the New Jersey state court to
order the defendant, and not the plaintiff class, to bear all of costs of
notice to the absent class members.4 8
Here a little background is helpful. In Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin,
decided shortly after the 1966 amendments to Rule 23, the Court held
that Rule 23 did not authorize a federal court to order a defendant to pay
for the costs of notice. 49  Eisen, however, was based on the Court's
interpretation of Rule 23, and did not address the issue of whether the
Due Process Clause would permit the shifting of notice costs from the
plaintiff to the defendant.
Arguably the Due Process Clause would allow greater flexibility, as
strongly suggested by the Court in Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank &
Trust Co. 50  Decided around the time of International Shoe, Mullane
involved a state court aggregate proceeding created by state law to settle
46. Id. at 879. More specifically, for Justice Kennedy, due process protects "a person against
having the Government impose burdens upon him except in accordance with the valid laws of the
land," and "[t]his is no less true with respect to the power of a sovereign to resolve disputes through
judicial process than with respect to the power of a sovereign to prescribe rules of conduct for those
within its sphere." Id. (quoting in part Giaccio v. Pennsylvania, 382 U.S. 399, 403 (1966)).
47. DTD Enters., Inc. v. Wells, 130 S. Ct. 7, 7 (2009) (opinion of Kennedy, J.), cert. denied.
48. Id.
49. 417 U.S. 156, 176-79 (1974).
50. 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
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claims against a common trust fund trustee. Such "common trust
funds" were authorized by state banking law to permit "donors and
testators of moderately sized trusts" to join their trusts together for
common administration by a corporate fiduciary.5 2 Thus, by sharing the
costs of a corporate fiduciary, "diversification of risk and economy of
management can be extended to those whose capital standing alone
would not obtain such [an] advantage." The aggregate proceeding at
issue in Mullane sought to periodically settle the liability of the corporate
fiduciary to the trustees and beneficiaries of the constituent trusts, with
the "decree in each such judicial settlement of accounts made binding
and conclusive." 54
Mullane is commonly known for its holding that due process only
required notice "reasonably calculated" to apprise the absent, non-
present plaintiff parties of the proceedings. 5 But the Court in Mullane
more specifically held that the quality of the notice may be reduced if
requiring more would "dissipate [the] advantages" of the underlying
good the notice sought to protect, in this case the benefit of common trust
56iffund administration. Thus, if some absent plaintiffs, in that case
contingent beneficiaries of the small trusts administered by the common
pool trustee, were too difficult or impossible to find, then due process
would permit the use of newspaper notice. 57  This is because
individualized, mailed notice would make it economically infeasible to
establish and manage common trust funds in the first place.
The "self-defeating" rationale at the heart of Mullane strongly
suggests that the permissibility of any notice procedure under the Due
Process Clause depends on the impact of the procedure on the
substantive objectives of the law. Under Mullane, one could sacrifice an
abstract, idealized procedure like individualized notice to ensure that the
interests that procedure was meant to protect (like the benefits of
common trust administration) are, in fact, protected. 59  Indeed, the
51. Id. at 307-09.
52. Id. at 307-08.
53. Id. at 308.
54. Id. at 309.
55. Id. at 314.
56. Id. at 317-18.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. See Owen M. Fiss, The Allure of Individualism, 78 IOWA L. REV. 965, 976 (1993) ("As
can be seen most clearly in his unwillingness to impose a requirement of actual notice, [Justice
Jackson's] fundamental concern [in Mullane] was to render the common trust a viable financial
instrument, and for that purpose, he was prepared to compromise certain individualistic values and to
1034 Vol. 65
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reasoning of Mullane could support more exotic notice procedures, like
shifting the costs of notice to the defendant, to ensure that the underlying
right to be free from a breach of contract was effectively enforced.60
DTD Enterprises did not implicate Eisen because it was a state court
class action, butit did implicate the due process concerns addressed in
Mullane. Rather than weigh the costs and benefits of a procedure based
on its effect on the parties' substantive interests, as the Court did in
Mullane, Justice Kennedy focused on the New Jersey court's deviation
from abstract, idealized procedure. 6 1  In particular, Justice Kennedy
made clear that the money the defendant would use to pay for notice is a
"property interest" that may be destroyed completely if a meritless claim
is filed against the defendant, leaving it with no way to recover its
costs.62 Thus, "there is considerable force to the argument that a hearing
in which the trial court does not consider the underlying merits of the
class-action suit is not consistent with due process because it is not
sufficient, or appropriate, to protect the property interest at stake." 6 3
To support his conclusion that the defendant has a "property interest"
in its defense costs, Justice Kennedy cited Logan v. Zimmerman Brush
Co., where the Court, citing Mullane perhaps incorrectly,6 concluded
that "a cause of action is a species of property protected by the . .. Due
Process Clause." 65 Presumably, according to Justice Kennedy, the right
not to pay the plaintiffs' notice costs is a similar procedural "property
interest" that, as put by the Court in Logan, "the State may not finally
destroy ... without first giving the putative owner an opportunity to
present his claim of entitlement." 6 6
But Mullane also stands for the proposition that an entitlement like a
claim can be destroyed without a hearing (such as when a claimholder
does not receive notice of the hearing destroying the claim) if doing so
would protect the primary entitlement the claim is meant to protect.
allow what I have called a representation of interests.").
60. See id. at 977 ("In Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacqueline, Justice Powell broke from Mullane-
not Mullane's specific ruling about the insufficiency of newspaper notice, but its underlying
principle.")
61. DTD Enters., 130 S. Ct. at 8.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. See Thomas W. Merrill, The Landscape of Constitutional Property, 86 VA. L. REv. 885,
913 n. 110 (2000) ("[T]he cause of action in Mullane was designed to protect an existing property
right-the beneficial interest in a trust fund-and it may be that the Court was relying on the
underlying trust property to satisfy the property requirement.").
65. 455 U.S. 422, 428 (1982).
66. Id. at 434.
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Indeed, despite some language suggesting an absolute entitlement to an
"opportunity to be heard," 67  Mullane quite explicitly allows for the
taking away of that "opportunity" when the substantive objectives of the
law so dictate.
However, as with personal jurisdiction, Justice Kennedy gave short
shrift to the possibility that substantive considerations may dictate
abandoning a procedural right. Here Justice Kennedy's use of the
language "property interest" is telling, because it invokes an entitlement
to a procedure that cannot be taken away absent some sort of hearing,
itself a procedural entitlement.6 8 Admittedly, this due process hearing
could allow for the consideration of substantive concerns like the ones
considered in Mullane. But Justice Kennedy did not hint at what those
considerations might be apart from the merits of the underlying claim,
which unduly restricts the situations where cost-shifting would be
justified. For example, one can imagine situations where an inquiry into
the merits for purposes of cost-shifting may be premature because the
plaintiff has not had an opportunity to obtain sufficient discovery on the
merits.69 In fact, by casting the procedural right as a "property right,"
rather than, say, a matter of judicial discretion,70 Justice Kennedy
strongly suggested that no substantive considerations may exist to justify
the taking of such "property."
III. A CHANGE IN COURSE
I have suggested so far that, as recently as 2011, Justice Kennedy
adhered to a view of due process that focused on abstract procedures and
ignored the impact of those procedures on the substantive entitlements
they protected. However, in his most recent opinions, I perceive a
change in Justice Kennedy's approach to the relationship between
procedure and substance. Specifically, Justice Kennedy has recently
displayed a greater sensitivity to the substantive objectives at issue in
67. See Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 305, 314 (1950) (stating that
"[t]he fundamental requisite of due process of law is the opportunity to be heard.") (quoting Grannis
v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394 (1914)).
68. DTD Enters., Inc. v. Wells, 130 S. Ct. 7, 8 (2009).
69. This is one of the central criticisms of Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), a decision
authored by Justice Kennedy that, in essence, permitted the dismissal of a claim based on the merits
prior to discovery. See Scott Dodson, New Pleading, New Discovery, 109 MICH. L. REv. 53, 59-68
(2010).
70. See Mark Moller, Class Action Defendants' New Lochnerism, 2012 UTAH L. REv. 319,
322 (2012) (arguing that, historically, "judicial regulation of parties' opportunities to offer evidence
was seen as a subconstitutional matter left to courts' reasoned discretion").
Vol. 651036
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procedural cases, and, as a result, a greater willingness to adjust
procedure in light of those objectives. In other words, I detect a shift
from identifying and elevating an idealized picture of procedure to seeing
procedure as a tool that is subservient to the substantive rights at issue.
In noting this shift, I can only speculate at the considerations that
caused Justice Kennedy to take a different approach. There may be no
shift at all when one considers Justice Kennedy's entire jurisprudence.
But I do believe that any such shift is an important and welcome one, and
for that reason alone, it is worth discussing.
A. Justiciability
One noticeable manifestation of this changing of course can be found
in Hollingsworth v. Perry, which involved the constitutionality of
California's Proposition 8, an amendment to the state constitution which
prohibited the state from recognizing same-sex marriages. Proposition
8 arose as a voter-enacted ballot initiative, and thus was not proposed as
legislation by the state legislature or the governor.72 It therefore came as
no surprise that, after defending the constitutionality of Proposition 8 at
the district court level, the governor declined to appeal the district court's
ruling that Proposition 8 did, in fact, violate the U.S. Constitution. 73 At
issue before the Court was whether the supporters who proposed
Proposition 8 and fought to get it enacted had Article III standing to
appeal after the governor declined to do so. 74
The Court concluded that the supporters had no standing.75 Justice
Roberts, writing for the majority, took a page from both Justice Scalia in
Burnham and Justice Kennedy in Nicastro by focusing on history and
tradition to intuit abstract principles for allowing citizens to defend the
constitutionality of a state's laws.76 At the outset, Justice Roberts noted
correctly that the Court has "repeatedly held that such a 'generalized
grievance,' no matter how sincere, is insufficient to confer standing." 7 7
Moreover, Justice Roberts rejected the supporters' attempt to appeal on
the state's behalf, citing prior Supreme Court precedent prohibiting such
71. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2659 (2013).
72. See id.
73. Id. at 2660.
74. Id. at 2661-63.
75. Id. at 2668.
76. See id. at 2663-64.
77. Id. at 2662 (explaining cases supporting the proposition that a generalized grievance is
insufficient to confer standing).
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standing. Justice Roberts also appealed to both formalism and tradition
in the form of the Restatement (Third) of Agency to conclude that the
supporters "are plainly not agents of the State-'formal' or otherwise." 7 9
Justice Roberts's majority opinion would seem to be right up Justice
Kennedy's alley. Like in Nicastro, Justice Roberts sifted through history
and tradition to arrive at an answer that had little regard for the
substantive impact of that answer to the functioning of California's voter
initiative system. Indeed, Justice Roberts consciously ignored a recent
unanimous decision by the California Supreme Court concluding that the
Proposition 8 supporters did have standing to appeal given the purpose
and function of the initiative system.80  As he put it in the majority
opinion, "[a]ll that the California Supreme Court decision stands for is
that, so far as California is concerned, petitioners may argue in defense
of Proposition 8," a position that Justice Roberts concluded "cannot
override our settled law to the contrary."81
But Justice Kennedy dissented, 82 stating at the outset that the
majority opinion's "reasoning does not take into account the
fundamental principles or the practical dynamics of the initiative system
in California . ."83 In other words, Justice Kennedy dissented because
the majority failed to consider the substantive impact of its standing
decision.
The substantive impact is quite obvious when one considers how a
state voter initiative system works. As put by Justice Kennedy, "[t]he
very object of the initiative system is to establish a lawmaking process
that does not depend upon state officials," with the goal of giving people
"control of the political process" if their elected representatives are not
responsive to their concerns. 84 Accordingly, it would be absurd "if the
very officials the initiative process seeks to circumvent are the only
parties who can defend an enacted initiative when it is challenged in a
legal proceeding."85 It would be doubly absurd to only permit private
citizens to appeal when they receive permission from those same
78. Id. at 2667 (citing Lance v. Coffman, 549 U.S. 437, 441 (2007)).
79. Id. at 2666-67.
80. See id. at 2660, 2666-67.
81. Id. at 2666-67.
82. Id. at 2668 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Justices Clarence Thomas, Samuel Alito, and Sonia
Sotomayor joined the dissent. Id.
83. Id. (emphasis added).
84. Id at 2670-71 (quoting Perry v. Brown, 265 P.3d 1002, 1016 (Cal. 2011).
85. Id. at 2671 (citations omitted).
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circumvented parties in accordance with the Restatement (Third) of
Agency.86
Of course, Article III standing doctrine is designed to promote
federal values, not state ones, but Justice Kennedy was careful to show
how recognizing the standing of the proponents of Proposition 8 is
consistent with the objectives of Article III standing. As Justice
Kennedy noted, "[a] prime purpose of justiciability is to ensure vigorous
advocacy." 87  Indeed, one rationale for the prohibition against
"generalized grievances" is that a party with only a general interest in
enforcing the law will lack the motivation to develop the case." But,
Justice Kennedy noted, the majority's decision "insists upon litigation
conducted by state officials whose preference is to lose the case." 89
Justice Kennedy's approach in his dissent in Hollingsworth v. Perry
is in stark contrast to his plurality opinion in Nicastro. In Nicastro,
Justice Kennedy concluded that substantive considerations could never
be "controlling" in determining the permissibility of a court's exercise of
personal jurisdiction. 90  Instead, a court may only rely upon the
traditional basis for exercising personal jurisdiction over a defendant-
the defendant's implied consent. 91 In Hollingsworth v. Perry, it is Justice
Roberts, not Justice Kennedy, who took that approach. In Perry, Justice
Roberts concluded that substantive considerations cannot trump the
traditional basis for a private citizen to represent the interests of the
state-the state's consent.92
In contrast, in his Perry dissent, Justice Kennedy implicitly invoked
Mullane's reasoning by concluding that substantive considerations may
override traditional bases of standing if those bases would lead to self-
defeating results.9 3  Most obviously, requiring the authorization of the
state to allow a private citizen to defend an initiative would undermine
86. See id. at 2671-72.
87. Id. at 2674.
88. Lea Brilmayer, The Jurisprudence of Article III. Perspectives on the "Case or
Controversy" Requirement, 93 HARV. L. REV. 297, 306 (1979) (noting effect of ideological plaintiff
on rights of those injured). Hollingsworth v. Perry did not implicate the separation-of-powers
concerns that justify the prohibition against generalized grievances, as it involved the defense of a
state law, and not the enforcement of federal law. See Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 577
(1992) (noting that recognizing standing for generalized harm "is to permit Congress to transfer from
the President to the courts the Chief Executive's most important constitutional duty, to 'take Care
that the Laws be faithfully executed."') (quoting U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 3)).
89. Perry, 133 S. Ct. at 2674 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
90. J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 885-86 (2011).
91. See id. at 881.
92. Perry, 133 S. Ct. at 2666 (Roberts, C.J., majority).
93. See id at 2671 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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the very point of California's voter initiative-to permit citizens to pass
that very same initiative without the state's authorization. 9 4 But more
importantly, Justice Kennedy pointed out that requiring state
authorization would undermine a primary purpose of Article III standing
doctrine itself, by ensuring the absence of any "vigorous advocacy"
because the only party allowed to defend the initiative has no incentive to
do so.95
Arguably, one should not read too much into Justice Kennedy's
dissent in Perry. As an initial matter, Justice Kennedy, as a native
Californian, was probably especially knowledgeable and protective of
the state's voter initiative system. More importantly, in a companion
case involving the federal Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), United
States v. Windsor, Justice Kennedy concluded that standing was present
even though, like the governor in Perry, the United States had no actual
interest in defending the constitutionality of DOMA.96 There, Justice
Kennedy noted that the United States nevertheless continued to enforce
DOMA, and thus concluded that there was an actual dispute despite the
United States' admittedly half-hearted enforcement. 9 7  In addition,
Justice Kennedy concluded that the lack of adversity was not a problem
because such adversity is only a prudential requirement, and that a
vigorous defense can be assured in this case through the use of amici.98
Finally, Justice Kennedy stressed that "the merits question . . . is one of
immediate importance to the Federal Government and to hundreds of
thousands of persons."9 9
Like in Perry, Justice Kennedy in Windsor displayed a sensitivity to
the substantive impact of his justiciability ruling. However, Justice
Kennedy did not give the same care to Article III values that he did in
Perry. Whereas, in Perry, he noted the importance of standing
requirements in ensuring "vigorous advocacy," in Windsor, Justice
Kennedy relegated adversity, a precondition for vigorous advocacy, to
merely a "prudential" concern, and was perhaps too hasty in concluding
that amici could pick up the slack. Thus, Justice Kennedy's opinion in
Windsor appeared less like a considered balancing of interests and more
like an attempt to reach the merits by any means necessary.
94. See id. at 2673-75.
95. Id. at 2674.
96. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2684 (2013) (noting that "the President ...
instructed the Department [of Justice] not to defend the statute in Windsor").
97. Id. at 2686-87.
98. Id. at 2687-88.




The shift evidenced by Justice Kennedy in Perry would take some
time to manifest itself in the class action context. Consider, for example,
American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant, decided only several
days before Perry, where the Court addressed whether a class action
waiver in an arbitration agreement would frustrate the enforcement of
federal antitrust law, particularly for claims that are too small and costly
to litigate in individual actions.1" Justice Scalia, writing for a majority
that included Justice Kennedy, concluded that the policies of antitrust
enforcement did not bar the use of a class action waiver.101 Among other
things, the Court noted the "usual rule that litigation is conducted by and
on behalf of the individual named parties only," and thus antitrust policy
cannot frustrate an "agree[ment] to arbitrate pursuant to that 'usual rule,'
and it would be remarkable for a court to erase that expectation."1 0 2 Here
the abstract, idealized picture of procedure that motivated Burnham and
Nicastro resurfaced yet again.
But Italian Colors can be explained, in part, by the influence of
Justice Scalia on the Court's class action jurisprudence. In fact, Justice
Scalia has authored most of the Court's recent class action decisions, and
in those decisions, he has stressed that the class action is "an exception to
the usual rule that litigation is conducted by and on behalf of the
individual named parties only."' 0 3 But Justice Scalia passed away on
February 13, 2016.' And in the Court's first class action decision after
his death, Justice Kennedy not only took charge, but provided an
alternative, functional account of the class action in line with his own
thoughts in Perry.
That case, Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo, involved a class action
of meat processing workers seeking overtime for the time spent "donning
and doffing" protective gear.'0 5  Under the Fair Labor Standards Act
(FLSA), a qualified worker is entitled to receive overtime if he or she
100. Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2308 (2013).
101. See id at 2309-10.
102. Id. at 2309 (citation omitted).
103. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 348 (2011) (quoting Califano v. Yamasaki,
442 U.S. 682, 70(-01 (1979)).
104. Adam Liptak, Antonin Scalia, Justice on the Supreme Court, Dies at 79, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
14, 2016, at Al.
105. 136 S. Ct. 1036, 1041 (2016). Tyson involved both a Rule 23 class action and a
"collective action" under the Fair Labor Standards Act. Id. at 1042. For purposes of this essay, I
will focus on the Rule 23 class action.
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works in excess of forty hours in a week. 10 6 The workers contended that
any overtime calculation should include the time each worker spent
"donning and doffing."107 However, the employer, Tyson Foods, failed
to keep any records of those times. 108 For that reason, the workers
invoked Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., decided in 1946, in which
the Supreme Court held that, in the absence of time records, a worker
seeking overtime pay may use representative evidence of other workers
to support an inference of the amount owed. 109
The issue before the Court in Tyson was whether the plaintiffs could
use such representative evidence in a Rule 23 class action." 0 Again,
some background is helpful. In 2011, the same year the Court decided
Nicastro, the Court in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes reviewed the
certification of a large-scale employment discrimination class action."'
There, the district court, among other things, approved the use of a
procedure to determine the backpay owed to the class by first 1) trying a
small sample of cases before a special master and then 2) using the
results of those cases to determine the backpay for the entire class.1 12
In a majority opinion written by, of course, Justice Scalia and joined
by Justice Kennedy, the Court rejected this use of what it called a "Trial
by Formula." 1 3  Echoing Justice Kennedy's concerns in DTD
Enterprises, the Court concluded that because of such a procedure, "Wal-
Mart w[ould] not be entitled to litigate its statutory defenses to individual
claims." 14
Curiously, unlike Justice Kennedy in DTD Enterprises, the Court did
not see this restriction on the defendant's procedural rights as a due
process concern. Instead, the Court invoked the Rules Enabling Act,
which prohibits any rule of civil procedure from "abridg[ing],
enlarg[ing], or modify[ing] any substantive right."' 15 Presumably, using
Rule 23 to certify a class employing such a sampling procedure would
violate the Rules Enabling Act because Rule 23 would allow for the
106. 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1) (2012).
107. Tyson, 136 S. Ct. at 1041.
108. Id at 1042 (noting that "[a]t no point did Tyson record the time each employee spent
donning and doffing").
109. Id. at 1044-45 (citing Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., 328 U.S. 680, 686-88
(1946)).
110. Id at 1043-47.
111. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 342 (2011).
112. Id. at 348, 367.
113. Id at 367.
114. Id
115. Id (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2006)).
1042 Vol. 65
CHANGING COURSE
"abridg[ing]" of the defendant's "substantive right" to assert statutory
defenses. Accordingly, just as Justice Kennedy in DTD Enterprises
viewed the right to a defense as a "property interest" for due process
purposes, Justice Scalia in Wal-Mart viewed the right to assert an
individual defense as a "substantive right" that cannot be curtailed by
Rule 23.116
This view that certain procedural rights are "property interests" or
"substantive rights" that cannot be trumped by other considerations poses
an existential threat to the class action itself. As noted by Justice Scalia
in his majority opinion in Wal-Mart, the class action is "an exception to
the usual rule that litigation is conducted by and on behalf of the
individual named parties only." 1 7 Accordingly, as evidenced by Wal-
Mart, the Court has been hostile to any attempt to use the class action to
fundamentally deviate from the procedures that would be used in
litigation conducted by the class members themselves. But this hostility
has the potential to destroy the class action, insofar as this hostility may
lead to a prohibition on any deviation from the procedures used in
individual litigation.
Indeed, in a case decided two years after Wal-Mart, Comcast Corp.
v. Behrend, the Court, in a majority opinion authored by (who else)
Justice Scalia and joined by Justice Kennedy, suggested, without
deciding, that a class action cannot be certified at all if it does not
involve an accurate procedure to determine the individual damages of
each class member.' 18 Such a holding would have the effect of banning
almost all class actions involving damage claims because it would
require individual hearings on damages absent proof that the hearings
were clearly unnecessary. Again, individual hearings are the ideal, and
the ideal threatened to extinguish the class action exception entirely.
The use of representative evidence in Tyson implicated both Wal-
Mart and Comcast. In Tyson, the class used an expert to measure the
doffing and donning times of representative workers to arrive at an
average time to be used for segments of the class as a whole.1 9 Then the
class employed another expert to use those averages to determine what
116. See id.
117. Id. at 348 (quoting Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 700-01 (1979)).
118. See Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426, 1434-35 (2013).
119. Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo, 136 S. Ct. 1036, 1043 (2016) (noting that the expert
"conducted 744 videotaped observations and analyzed how long various donning and doffing
activities took. He then averaged the time taken in the observations to produce an estimate of 18
minutes a day for the cut and retrim departments and 21.25 minutes for the kill department.").
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percentage of the class qualified for overtime. 120 This procedure did not
allow the employer Tyson to assert individual defenses against specific
class members, at least not at this stage of the proceedings, and thus was
clearly in tension with Wal-Mart.12 1
Moreover, there was considerable variance on the donning and
doffing times across the workers. Some took seconds, while others took
as much as nine minutes. 122 There was also variance among the workers
as to who would be entitled to overtime pay if the donning and doffing
times were added. 12 3 Thus, there was a risk that some class members
would get inaccurate damages based on these averages, which would be
in clear tension with Comcast. Indeed, there was a risk that some of the
class members would not be entitled to overtime at all and thus were
completely uninjured, raising the issue of whether some class members
even had standing to sue. 12 4
Given these difficulties, one could imagine Justice Kennedy joining
an opinion holding that the use of such representative evidence by the
experts in Tyson made class certification inappropriate. Indeed, one
could also imagine the Court firmly holding what it hinted at in both
Wal-Mart and Comcast-that a class action involving individualized
remedies cannot be certified at all because it would depart too much
from the ideal procedure of individualized hearings.
But, as with Hollingsworth v. Perry, Justice Kennedy in Tyson took a
different approach. Justice Kennedy first expressed a sensitivity to the
substantive impact of any decision by the Court by stating up front that
"the Court would reach too far were it to establish general rules
governing the use of statistical evidence, or so-called representative
evidence, in all class-action cases."1 2 5 Then Justice Kennedy turned to
the use of representative evidence in FLSA overtime cases, noting that
the Court in Mt. Clemens permitted such evidence because "the
'remedial nature of [the FLSA] and the great public policy which it
embodies ... militate against making' the burden of proving
uncompensated work 'an impossible hurdle for the employee."' 1 26 Thus,
rather than focus on any deviation of abstract, idealized procedures to the
120. Id. at 1043-44.
121. See id. at 1046.
122. Id. at 1055 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
123. Id.
124. Id at 1052-53 (Roberts, J., concurring).
125. Id. at 1046 (Kennedy, J., majority).
126. Id. at 1047 (quoting Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., 328 U.S. 680, 687 (1946)).
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exclusion of substantive concerns, Justice Kennedy put substantive
concerns at the forefront.
Justice Kennedy then concluded that the use of representative
evidence was permissible in this case for two reasons. It is important to
spend some time on the first reason to fully understand the second
reason. As to the first reason, Justice Kennedy distinguished Wal-Mart
from this case by noting that, unlike in Wal-Mart, such representative
evidence was permissible as a matter of law in individual cases as
articulated in Mt. Clemens.12 7  Thus, the use of such representative
evidence in a class action was not a deviation from individual cases but
actually consistent with such cases. Indeed, Justice Kennedy went
further to suggest that permitting the use of representative evidence in
individual actions but not in class actions "would ignore the Rules
Enabling Act's pellucid instruction that use of the class device cannot
'abridge . .. any substantive right."'
1 2 8
This first reason is remarkable. Earlier, I noted that the Court's
views of the Rules Enabling Act in Wal-Mart posed an existential threat
to the class action. This is because the Court in Wal-Mart suggested that
the procedures used in individual hearings, such as a party's ability to
assert affirmative defenses, were seen as "substantive rights" that one
cannot deviate from, and the class action is by definition a deviation
from those procedures. But Justice Kennedy in Tyson did not consider
the class action an exception to an ideal, but put it on equal footing with
individual proceedings. In fact, Justice Kennedy concluded that it would
be a violation of the Rules Enabling Act not to permit a class action to
use representative evidence if such evidence is permissible in an
individual action. 12 9
Arguably Justice Kennedy was able to put the class action on equal
footing with an individual action because the individual action itself was
a deviation from the norm. But it is unclear why the vision of procedure
at the heart of Comcast and Wal-Mart would permit such a deviation
even in an individual proceeding. If a party cannot assert an individual
defense because of the use of average awards, then a party cannot not do
so in either an individual action or a class proceeding.
In other words, a commitment to the vision of ideal procedure in
Comcast and Wal-Mart would not use the Mt. Clemens ruling to support
the use of representative evidence in class actions. Instead, it would
127. Id. at 1048-49.




question the continuing validity of Mt. Clemens itself, or at least Justice
Kennedy's interpretation of it. And that is precisely what Justice
Thomas did in his Tyson dissent, noting that the majority not only
misinterpreted Mt. Clemens, 130 but that "[t]he majority's reliance on Mt.
Clemens is questionable given that decision's shaky foundations."'31
But I do not think that Justice Kennedy is simply piggybacking off of
the Court's precedent in Mt. Clemens. Instead, I see Justice Kennedy as
changing the relevant "substantive right" for Rules Enabling Act
purposes. By invoking "the 'remedial nature of [the FLSA] and the great
public policy which it embodies,"1 32 I take Justice Kennedy as placing
the right to overtime pay as the relevant "substantive right," not the
procedures used to obtain it. This would explain why Justice Kennedy
placed the class action on equal footing with individualized proceedings.
Both are simply different tools for achieving the "great public policy" of
the FLSA.
In my view, Justice Kennedy's second reason for permitting
representative evidence in Tyson can only be understood in light of this
suggested shift in the relevant "substantive right." As for his second
reason, Justice Kennedy concluded that Tyson Foods itself may be
responsible for the problems it identified. For example, in Justice
Kennedy's view, Tyson Foods could not assert individual defenses
because it failed to keep records in the first place, and thus "there were
no alternative means for the employees to establish their hours worked"
other than through representative evidence. 13 3 Thus, Tyson Foods's only
recourse was to question the admissibility of the class's representative
evidence. However, because Tyson Foods consistently objected to the
very existence of the class action, it failed to challenge the admissibility
of the expert reports at trial. 134
Moreover, Justice Kennedy pointed out that, prior to trial, the class
actually proposed to bifurcate proceedings, which would allow a court to
130. Id. at 1058 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (noting that "the majority today goes beyond what Mt.
Clemens held").
131. Id. at 1057.
132. Id. at 1047 (Kennedy, J., majority) (quoting Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., 328
U.S. 680, 687 (1946)).
133. Id.
134. See id. at 1047, 1049 ("Petitioner, however, did not raise a challenge to respondents'
experts' methodology under Daubert; and, as a result, there is no basis in the record to conclude it
was legal error to admit that evidence."); see also id. at 1044 ("Instead, as it had done in its
opposition to class certification, [Tyson Foods] argued to the jury that the varying amounts of time it




resolve common issues in a common proceeding and then resolve
individual issues in separate hearings. 1 35  Thus, such a bifurcation
procedure would allow for both a class action and the very individual
procedures that Tyson Foods argued it was entitled to. However, Tyson
Foods opposed the proposed bifurcation below, and Justice Kennedy
noted that Tyson Foods "now seeks to profit from the difficulty it
caused," suggesting, without concluding, that any difficulties
encountered by Tyson Foods in identifying uninjured defendants may be
"invited." 1 36
Justice Kennedy's second reason for permitting the use of
representative evidence would not make sense if he fully accepted the
view of abstract, idealized procedure at the heart of both Wal-Mart and
Comcast. In Wal-Mart, the right to assert affirmative defenses is a
"substantive right" full stop. 137 Accordingly, why would Tyson Foods
have any obligation to challenge the admissibility of the expert reports or
accept bifurcation if such procedures are less than what Tyson Foods was
fully entitled to?
But Justice Kennedy's second reason does make sense if the relevant
"substantive right" was not the procedures, but the entitlement the
procedures are designed to protect. If the relevant "substantive right" is,
in fact, the "remedial nature" of the FLSA, then Tyson Foods looks less
like a party seeking to fully vindicate their rights than a party seeking to
manipulate procedure to avoid paying the overtime it owed.
Again, the spirit of Mullane's "self-defeating" principle permeates
Justice Kennedy's reasoning here. Protecting Tyson Foods's "property
interest" in individualized procedures would provide a blueprint for
employers to avoid paying overtime to its employees, thereby
undermining the very objectives of the FLSA and the rights of action it
provides. Thus, rather than allow employers to profit from failing to
keep records and rejecting compromise measures like bifurcation, Justice
Kennedy (at least in my view) would prefer deviating from ideal
procedures to ensure that the workers' right to overtime pay is protected.
Finally, I do not think that Justice Kennedy's joining of the opinion
in Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins undermines this shift.13 8 Spokeo, which was
decided shortly after Tyson, concerned whether a plaintiff asserting a
class action had standing to sue Spokeo, Inc., an information retrieval
135. Id. at 1050.
136. Id.
137. Supra notes 115-16 and accompanying text.
138. 136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016).
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service, for violating the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA).1 3 9  The
plaintiff alleged that Spokeo provided inaccurate information about the
plaintiff and that Spokeo thereby violated his statutory rights to notice of
these inaccuracies as outlined in the FCRA.1 4 0  The district court
concluded that the plaintiff lacked standing, but the Ninth Circuit
reversed, concluding that the plaintiff had asserted a "particularized"
injury as to him alone.14 1
The Court, in a majority opinion written by Justice Alito and joined
by Justice Kennedy, concluded that the Ninth Circuit's analysis was
incomplete because it did not do a separate inquiry as to whether the
harm was "concrete." 42 In so holding, Justice Alito's opinion alluded to
the abstract approach taken by Justice Scalia in Burnham by noting that
"whether an intangible harm constitutes injury in fact, both history and
the judgment of Congress play important roles." 14 3 But Justice Alito
began by discussing the functions of standing, noting that the doctrine
"serves to prevent the judicial process from being used to usurp the
powers of the political branches."l4 4 Thus, despite the appeals to history
and tradition, functional considerations remained front and center.
Moreover, the outcome of the Court's decision is not as anti-
substantive as it first appears. Admittedly, the Court, in effect, reversed
the Ninth Circuit's conclusion that there was sufficient standing to sue,
and thus appears to frustrate the private enforcement of the FCRA. But
the Court's reversal can be easily justified by the functionalist concerns
that animated Justice Kennedy's dissent in Perry. In particular, Justice
Alito's opinion noted that a violation of a statutory right to a procedure,
in this case the reporting procedures of the FCRA, "may result in no
harm." 45 Although unstated, this independent inquiry into harm can be
justified as ensuring the "vigorous advocacy" that Justice Kennedy called
a "prime purpose of justiciability" of standing in Perry.14 6 That vigorous
advocacy is all the more important in a class action, where many of the
class members are not present to assert their claims. Indeed, it is worth
noting that Justice Ginsburg's dissent, joined by Justice Sotomayor, only
139. Id. at 1544 (citing 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1681x (2012 & Supp. 2016)).
140. Id. at 1545-46.
141. Id at 1546.
142. Id. at 1550.
143. Id. at 1549.
144. Id. at 1547 (quoting Clapper v. Amnesty Int'l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1146 (2013)).
145. Id. at 1550.
146. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2674 (2013) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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faulted the majority for choosing to remand when it could have very
easily found that the alleged injury was sufficiently concrete. 14 7
IV. CONCLUSION
Again, I can only speculate as to the causes of this shift in Justice
Kennedy's views, and some of my speculations pepper the analysis
above. Moreover, given my sample size of cases, I am willing to
concede that any shift I perceive may be illusory. But I believe that it is
real, and there is some evidence of this shift even in Justice Kennedy's
recent decisions on race, 14 8 the very decisions that presumably inspired
his remarks supporting a judge's changing course over time. 149 And if it
is real, I would argue that it is a shift worth celebrating, because it would
mark a return to the functionalist roots of the 1966 amendments that gave
rise to Rule 23.
147. Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1555-56 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). As this was going to press the
Court decided Microsoft v. Baker, No. 15-457 (U.S. Sup. Ct. June 12, 2017), in which the Court
concluded that federal courts lacked appellate jurisidiction over a denial of class certification that
lead to a voluntary dismissal of the underlying claims. Admittedly, Justice Kennedy's support for the
majority holding may provide counterevidence against a shift, but the complexity of the case makes
such a conclusion far from certain, and I hope to address this case in future writing.
148. Compare, for example, Justice Kennedy's views concerning voluntary efforts to avoid
disparate impact liability for Title VII claims in Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557 (2009), with his
majority opinion supporting disparate impact liability for Fair Housing Act claims in Texas
Department of Housing and Community Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct.
2507 (2015).
In Ricci, Justice Kennedy, writing for a majority, concluded that a city fire department
cannot provide preferential treatment to minority applicants to avoid disparate impact liability under
Title VII unless the city "can demonstrate a strong basis in evidence that, had it not taken the action,
it would have been liable under the disparate-impact statute." Ricci, 557 U.S. at 563. As put by
Justice Kennedy, "[w]hatever the City's ultimate aim-however well-intentioned or benevolent it
might have seemed-the City made its employment decision because of race." Id. at 579-80. Thus,
in Ricci, Justice Kennedy takes a formalistic view of the racial discrimination prohibited by Title
VII.
In contrast, in Inclusive Communities, Justice Kennedy, again writing for a majority,
concluded that the Fair Housing Act permitted disparate impact claims, noting that "[r]ecognition of
disparate-impact claims is consistent with the FHA's central purpose," which is to prohibit
"unlawful practices" such as "zoning laws and other housing restrictions that function unfairly to
exclude minorities from certain neighborhoods without any sufficient justification." Inclusive
Cmtys, 135 S. Ct. at 2521. But, as Justice Thomas, in dissent, pointed out, by permitting such
disparate impact liability, "parties fearful of disparate-impact claims may let race drive their
decisionmaking in hopes of avoiding litigation altogether," the very conduct the Court sought to
curtail in Ricci. See id. at 2550 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing Ricci). The decisions are not
inconsistent, but Justice Kennedy's formal conception of racial discrimination in Ricci seemed to be
less of a preoccupation for him when he considered the facially neutral "zoning laws and other
housing restrictions" that function to exclude racial minorities in Inclusive Communities.
149. Mark Sherman, Justice: Changing Course on the Bench Is Not Weakness, APNEWS.COM
(Sept. 23, 2016), https://apnews.com/93476b06b78c409393f38df4d5d507b7.
KANSAS LAW REVIEW
It is worth pointing out why such a return is worth celebrating. The
abstract, idealized procedure approach found in such cases as Justice
Scalia's plurality in Burnham, Justice Kennedy's own plurality opinion
in Nicastro, Justice Roberts's majority opinion in Hollingsworth v.
Perry, and Justice Scalia's majority opinion in Wal-Mart has a number of
advantages. Such an approach can protect against judges using vague
notions of "fairness" to impose their own subjective preferences.15 0  It
can also take advantage of the wisdom of the past. There are usually
good reasons why certain traditional procedures persist and others do
not. But a too-rigid approach can lead not only to suboptimal results,
but, as recognized in Mullane and in Justice Kennedy's opinions in Perry
and Tyson, it can lead to results that may undermine the very rights and
objectives justifying those procedures.
This concern with the suboptimal and oftentimes self-defeating
disadvantages of focusing solely on abstract procedure at the expense of
substance certainly animated the 1966 amendments to Rule 23. The
advisory committee notes to the 1966 amendments pointed out that the
prior rule sought to be "defined in terms of the abstract nature of the
rights involved," resulting in a rule that, among other things, was
"obscure and uncertain" and that did not "provide an adequate guide to
the proper extent of the judgments in class actions. For the 1966
amendments, in contrast, "[t]he reform of Rule 23 was intended to shake
the law of class actions free of abstract categories . .. and to rebuild the
law on functional lines responsive to those recurrent life patterns which
call for mass litigation through representative parties."l 52
One could argue that the 1966 amendments was not quite successful
in crafting a rule responsive to substantive concerns. 153 But in being
sensitive to "those recurrent life patterns which call for" class treatment,
the 1966 amendments produced a class action rule that has been quite
useful, and has the potential to be more useful still.1 54
Accordingly, I agree wholeheartedly with Justice Kennedy's view
that the questioning of premises is a sign of a judge's fidelity to the law.
150. See Burnham v. Superior Court of Cal., 495 U.S. 604, 623 (1990) (criticizing the
"subjectivity, and hence inadequacy" of using fairness considerations in determining whether the
exercise of personal jurisdiction comports with the Due Process Clause).
151. FED. R. Clv. P. 23 advisory committee's note to 1966 amendment; 39 F.R.D. 69 (1966).
152. Kaplan, supra note 3, at 497. Ben Kaplan was the reporter to the 1966 amendments. Id.
153. See Robert G. Bone, Walking the Class Action Maze: Toward a More Functional Rule 23,
46 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 1097, 1102-05 (2013) (making this argument).
154. Kaplan, supra note 3, at 497, and accompanying text; see also Sergio J. Campos, Mass
Torts and Due Process, 65 VAND. L. REv. 1059, 1076-79 (2012) (arguing for a more expansive
interpretation of Rule 23).
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This is because a willingness to abandon tradition in the face of self-
defeating consequences represents the right kind of fidelity-a fidelity to
the purposes and objectives of the law rather than its forms and
traditions. And, as far as I can tell, Justice Kennedy practices what he
preaches.
